We test theoretical propositions from the literature on information and control in inter-
Introduction
The design of inter-firm agreements, particularly in the face of information asymmetry and uncertainty, has been one of the most vibrant areas of theoretical economic inquiry over the past two decades. Yet our empirical understanding about whether these arrangements are designed and work in a manner that is consistent with theory has lagged. This relative neglect reflects the complexity of the arrangements, the difficulty in accessing data, and the challenge of developing clean tests of theoretical predictions.
This paper is part of an ongoing investigation into contracting by Internet portals at the outset of the industry. In this paper, we analyze the use of contingent control rights in alliances between Internet portals and other firms.. Contingent control rights are provisions that give one of the contracting parties certain prerogatives in specific states of the world. In the agreements that we analyze, these states of the world relate to specific measures that provide information about the commercial or technical performance of the alliance. We find that these contingent control rights are important features of many, but not all, alliance contracts in our sample. The question of why some contracts use available performance-based contingent control rights more intensively than others (and still other contracts use them not at all) is the central issue that we seek to address here.
The question of contractual incompleteness has recently gained increasing attention in incomplete contracting theory. While this theory has typically assumed that complete contracts cannot be written, more recent extensions of this approach have suggested that under certain circumstances, contracts may be left intentionally incomplete. The intuition behind decisions not to contract on observable (and verifiable) performance measures is that these measures may be extremely noisy reflections of the desired performance. Under such circumstances, decisions to use or not to use these performance measures may have important incentive impacts on the contracting parties; in equilibrium, these decisions may depend on the quality of information contained in these measures and the relative knowledge of each party about the other's preferences (c.f. Aghion and Tirole [1997] and Dessein [2002] ).
Recent work has extended contract theory to include signaling. We examine two insights from these investigations:
• First, the theory suggests that agents will increasingly rely on contingent elements in contracts as uncertainty increases, as part of an effort to distinguish themselves from other firms (most specifically, Dessein [2004] , but see also Diamond [1991] ). The observed pattern of contracting in our sample-where contracts in younger segments of the Internet industry include more state-contingent provisions-is consistent with this view, though in some ways the picture is more complex than theory suggests.
• Second, the theory (Dessein [2004] ) suggests that increasing uncertainty about the congruence of the contracting parties' objective functions also increases the value of contingent control rights as a signal. To test this idea, we examine exclusivity provisions included in the contract. We argue that these exclusivity provisions are proxies for the ex ante incentive conflict anticipated between the two firms.
Since theory suggests that exclusivity provisions may be driven by a number of structural features of the negotiation in question (e.g., maximizing quasi-rents of an innovation or attempting to establish market power), we examine both the "raw" levels of exclusivity between the contracting parties and the "residual" exclusivity that is left over after using structural elements of the relationship to predict exclusivity levels in a first stage regression. Our analysis supports this view as well.
Despite the desirability of testing the various theoretical depictions of inter-firm agreements-not to mention the important role that alliances and licensing play in many high-technology industries-the structure of these agreements has attracted surprisingly little empirical attention. To assess this gap, we employ a sample of over 100 alliances involving Internet portals. Portal contracts are a particularly attractive empirical testing ground for three reasons:
First is the large number and heterogeneous nature of the contracts. Hundreds of consumer-oriented Internet companies went public during the second half of the 1990s. Many of these completed IPOs while still in their formative stages. Many incumbent companies also launched Internet initiatives. As a result, the contracting parties ranged from well-established corporations to very young entities.
• • Second, the standards for disclosure in this industry have been high. Publicly traded entities are required to file all "material" contracts. Due to the relatively limited revenues of many portals and other Internet concerns and the significant impact that announcements concerning alliances have had on these firms' share prices, the disclosure of agreements during this period was extensive. While firms could request confidential treatment for portions of the alliance agreements, their failure to disclose might become an issue if the firm was subsequently subject to shareholder litigation.
The final attractive aspect is the mapping between the contracts themselves and economic theory. These agreements carefully delineated ownership, exclusivity, and other provisions that have typically been examined in the theoretical depictions of contracting. In Elfenbein and Lerner [2003] , we argued that in the early years of the industry, the uncertainty surrounding the environment in which portals and partner firms contracted suggested that problems of non-contractibility were likely to exert powerful forces on the structure of contracts. Indeed, in this environment, the allocation of an observable subset of alliance assets were allocated as suggested by the property rights theory of Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1988] , although the relationship between ownership, control rights, and payment terms suggested that contracting in this setting was more complicated than existing theories lead us to believe.
• There is a relatively modest body of related empirical literature to this paper. Hall [1991] examined nearly 100 contracts across a spectrum of high-technology industries.
The analysis sought to test predictions from his model, which had hypothesized relationships between the exclusivity of the agreement, the strength of intellectual property rights, and the use of royalties. Ryall and Sampson [2002] clinically examine the nature of contractual language regarding alliances in several dozen biotechnology and electronics agreements. Robinson and Stuart [2002] examine 125 biotechnology alliances, including a measure of "information content" based on the length of the summary prepared by the consulting firm Recombinant Capital.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant theoretical economics research, which frames the empirical analyses. In Section 3, we provide a brief overview of Internet portals and the alliances into which they enter. In Section 4, we discuss the structure of the alliance contracts. We describe the creation of the data set in Section 5. Section 6 presents the analyses, and the final section concludes the paper.
Incomplete Contracts and Contingent Control Rights
The theory of incomplete contracts has been used to address a number of important questions about the boundaries of organizations and the design of relationships between firms. A standing critique of this literature, articulated by Tirole [1999] , is that contractual incompleteness is too often assumed and that consequently little progress has been made in exploring the sources of contractual incompleteness. This question is of interest to us in the investigation of portal alliances because we observe parties deciding to allocate control rights based upon readily available (and low cost) information about the performance of their partnership in some of their formal contracts, but not in others.
Economic theory has taken an increasing interest in this question. One set of insights into this question stems from the security design literature (e.g., Aghion and Bolton [1992] and Dewatripont and Tirole [1994] ) which examines how the choice of equity vs. debt financing impacts the incentives of financiers and entrepreneurs through the creation of differing profiles of control rights in different states of the world. Aghion and Bolton [1992] for instance, find that even in a setting where it is efficient to grant control to the entrepreneur, he may need to relinquish control to an investor in order to induce the financier to invest in the first place. A second set of insights has been generated by principle-agent theories that explicitly consider the relationship between the structure of the information asymmetry between two parties and their decision to allocate control rights. Dessein [2002] , for example, suggests that allocating more control rights to better-informed parties reduces information distortion, whereas Aghion and Tirole [1997] suggest that providing better-informed parties with more control rights provides the right incentives for information acquisition. Dessein [2004] carefully explores these questions in the context of strategic alliances. He depicts a setting where, if no information problems were present, the firm making the critical technological contribution to the project would retain complete control over the project (i.e., interference by the other party reduces the total surplus).
But because the innovating firm has private information about its quality or the congruence of its incentives with the other firm, it will signal this to its partner by providing the other firm with some control rights. This step is not too costly for a high quality firm (or a firm with highly congruent preferences), which knows that the information received by the other party is likely to be favorable, but can be costly for a low quality firm (or a firm that has different preferences than its partner).
Two different types of information problems influence the allocation of control rights in this setting. The first relates to the use of contingencies based on observable performance measures, and depends on the precision of this measure. The greater the level of noise contained in this performance measure, the more valuable a signal a single state-contingent control right becomes (i.e., the difference in the cost of providing the control right for high and low quality firms becomes greater). Thus, in equilibrium, the greater the uncertainty surrounding the project, the more control will be transferred to the other firm. The second information problem is the degree to which there is asymmetric information about the degree of incentive conflict. The greater the information gap between the two parties relating to the structure of their objective functions, the more likely the parties are to use the transfer of control rights as a signal (again, because the signal is more valuable).
The reader may note that the results of this model are quite different from those found in Aghion and Tirole [1997] or in Dessein [2002] . In the latter two models, relationships are more likely to be designed so that principals can use information to overrule agents when uncertainty or asymmetric information is lower. The key difference between these two views of the impact of uncertainty and asymmetric information on contract design is that only Dessein [2004] allows the agent to signal its preferences by offering control rights or contingent control rights. Allowing parties to signal, then, reverses some of the implications of the earlier works.
Portals and Portal Alliances
Portals-which can be defined as Internet sites that provide (directly or indirectly) a broad array of services and linkages to users-are a relatively new organizational form Many Internet portals, such as Yahoo!, originated as classified collections of links to other web sites. Others, such as Lycos, began as search engines, enabling users to locate web sites on certain topics or featuring specific phrases. Many portals were new entrants, some were producers of browser software (e.g., Netscape), and still others had previously operated proprietary on-line services (for instance, America Online).
Although subscribers to these proprietary services initially had access only to the features developed for the service itself, these firms increasingly began providing Internet access and created portals of their own. Beginning in 1997, portals began adding a broad array - Alliances also often permitted partners to rapidly test their business models and to acquire customer data. Even if they were executed on relatively unattractive terms, alliances could thus be beneficial for the partners as well.
The patterns of alliance formation provide some evidence that alliances were indeed thought to be critical to the strategies of many Internet portals and their alliance partners. America Online / Netscape, Yahoo, Lycos, Excite, and Microsoft-the firms with the strongest positions in the industry-were the firms most involved in alliance formation (Elfenbein [2004] ).
Alliance Contracts

A. Description
The alliance agreements themselves were, in general, complex and varied considerably in their structure, even within the same industry category. Consider the following two examples:
In December 1998, Autoweb.com, which operated a site that allowed users to research new automobiles and to purchase them online, entered into a 13-month Yahoo's competitors on its front page. Yahoo, in turn, was prohibited from including graphic links to more than three other auto merchants, and was prohibited from displaying banner advertisements from any competitor on specified pages. Payment and performance provisions were also specified. The contract detailed the number of impressions 3 that Yahoo was to deliver (by type of advertisement); it granted Autoweb access to a database where these impressions would be calculated; and it described the contingencies that would result should Yahoo fail to deliver the required number of impressions during the term of the agreement. In addition, the contract loosely specified some technical performance targets for Autoweb. As compensation, Yahoo received a fixed slotting fee and a referral fee for each click-through 4 under the agreement. This agreement did not involve the creation of a new site but rather focused on the links between two existing sites. Thus, the discussion of ownership was naturally limited; each party merely affirmed its ownership rights over the user data that it collected in the course of operations. In return for these links, Autobytel paid a fixed fee and would pay an additional transaction-based royalty for each purchase request over a specified number submitted by 4 A click-through occurs when a user follows a displayed link to another site.
5 Autobytel.com announced that it would merge with Autoweb in April, 2001.
Lycos' customers on the Autobytel site. 6 To ensure compliance, each firm was given audit rights to examine the others' records. Autobytel retained rights to all customer data, but agreed to provide aggregated customer profile data for Lycos.
As the examples above suggest, there was a great deal of heterogeneity in the alliances that portals entered into. In Elfenbein and Lerner [2003] we focus on the allocation of asset ownership and control rights. In this paper, we focus on the use of performance guarantees that grant one party or the other certain control rights in specific states of the world.
A number of different performance-based control rights were used in the alliance contracts. Table 1 
B. Mapping Between Theory and Analysis
The theoretical analysis and the structure of the alliance contracts discussed above motivate us to examine the use of contingent control right in portal alliance contracts.
Nonetheless, the mapping between theory and analysis is not seamless. This section describes how we think about these issues.
Regarding the use of contingent control rights in alliance contracts, Dessein
[2004] leads us to expect that the parties will increasingly acquiesce to making their continuation of the alliance dependent on observable measures, the higher the level of uncertainty in the environment at the time that the contract is signed. 7 In Dessein's [2004] treatment, it is worth noting, only the entrepreneur is interested in private benefits (i.e., those that do not correlate perfectly with the surplus generated by the alliance). As a result, the suggestion of this model is that it is only important to analyze the control rights or contingencies that the partner grants the portal as part of its signaling strategy. As we discuss in Elfenbein and Lerner [2003] , however, both parties may have objective functions that do not correlate perfectly with surplus generated by the alliance. Partners have multiple objectives in signing alliance contracts, including testing unproven business models, increasing the amount of traffic on their own websites, and using the external agreement as certification in order to obtain additional financing. Furthermore, the fact that partners additionally operate their own (non-alliance) websites may lead to an even further divergence in the objectives of the contracting parties. Portals, for their part, are likely to have many alliance partners and may be forced to trade off one partner for another in their use of proprietary customer information. Given these concerns, we examine the use of provisions that grant state-contingent control to either party, rather than focusing solely on rights granted to the portal.
We test the signaling hypothesis empirically by estimating the following equation:
where C i is a measure of the extent to which contract i employs contingencies, M i is a measure of the maturity of the industry (or industry segment) at the time the agreement was signed, X i are other observable characteristics of the contract i and its contracting parties, and ε i is the idiosyncratic error. We expect that β will be less than zero.
A second prediction of the Dessein [2004] model is that the degree of asymmetric information about preferences should also be positively related to the allocation of contingent control rights. While we cannot observe these information gaps directly, we are able to see one way in which the parties respond to potential incentive conflicts:
namely, the level of exclusivity provisions built into the contracts. Thus, in a second analysis we expand the model as follows: As a practical matter, the types of exclusivity that we observe in these contracts differ significantly from the types of exclusivity that theory leads us to expect. In particular, we observe a number of types of exclusivity provisions that place restrictions on both the upstream and downstream parties (by contrast, the technology licensing literature typically focuses on constraints that bind upstream parties). We discuss the specific exclusivity provisions in the following section. Although an inspection of the exclusivity provisions in these contracts leads us to believe that they may, at least, partially proxy for incentive conflict, in a separate analysis we attempt to eliminate the component of the exclusivity decisions that relate to the structural characteristics of the contract (stemming from theory) by predicting exclusivity using a first stage regression and use the residual as a proxy for incentive conflict in the second stage.
The empirical challenge of incorporating exclusivity into the regressions of contingent control rights is the standard one. Because contingent control rights and exclusivity are negotiated simultaneously as part of a single contract, the most that one can infer from a statistically significant relationship between these two measures of contract structure is a correlation in the data.
The Data Set
To undertake the analysis, we identified a set of 106 contracts between portals and other firms entered into between 1995 and 1999. These contracts were identified primarily from Recap/IT, a consulting firm that maintains a database of contracts For our analysis, we selected a random sample of 106 alliances from this database. We sought to create a population that avoided undesirable heterogeneity. In particular, we eliminated alliances where:
• One of the parties was non-profit organization.
• One of the parties had a controlling interest in the other, either through a majority equity stake or through a purchase option.
• The two parties had a previous alliance covering the same set of technologies, and consequently were renegotiating the terms of an earlier alliance.
We reviewed these documents carefully to identify the key features of these agreements. After considerable experimentation, we developed a coding form that captured the key features of these alliances. In many cases, firms filed multiple copies of the same documents with the SEC. In these cases, different versions of the documents were reviewed to insure that information that was redacted in one version was not included in another.
We also gathered two types of supplemental information. First, to assess the financial health of the contracting parties, we examined the Compustat and Worldscope databases for the end of the fiscal quarter immediately prior to the alliance. For firms where this information was not available from Compustat or Worldscope, we gathered the information from 10-K filings, IPO prospectuses, and other securities filings.
Second, we employed information from an Internet and on-line usage tracking service, Media Metrix (formerly known as PC Meter), which has compiled information from the earliest days of the industry. 8 For each of the two contracting parties, we assessed their Internet properties' "reach"-the percentage of all U.S. users who accessed the site at least once in a given month-and the total number of days and minutes that the average accessing user viewed the site in that month. In making these calculations, we compiled all properties owned by the contracting firm: for instance, the usage data for an alliance signed by Disney in 1999 would include information about visits to ABC.com. frequently were required after the agreement was signed: the development of material for the site (whether content, services, or technology), the maintenance and hosting of the site, the provision of customer service, order fulfillment, and billing. We coded these as +1 if the portal was required to make the greater effort on this dimension, -1 if the partner was required to do so, and 0 if the effort was jointly shared or not required by the agreement. While the sum of these five effort measures ranged from +5 to -5, in most cases, the bulk of the post-agreement effort was required of the partner.
Panel B presents the traffic on Internet sites of the two parties in the month before the signing of the agreement. Not surprisingly, portals' sites were visited by more users, more frequently, and for longer than partners' sites. In the ensuing analysis, we use the relative site visitation data as our proxy for the value of the partner's technology. Our assumption is that the higher the traffic on the partner's web site (relative to that of the portal), the more valuable is the partner's technology.
Panel C considers the relative financial health of the two parties. There was a great deal of variation, which reflected the fact that we examined the financial health of the entire corporate entity if it had 100% ownership of the contracting firm. For instance, in a transaction involving Snap.com, the financial information of its parent, General
Electric, was recorded.
Panel D provides information about the level of industry development at the time at which the contract was signed. In the sample of 106 alliance contracts, 67 different partner firms were represented. Of these, 63 firms fell into 26 distinct segments of the Internet industry and four were categorized as "traditional" firms. These industry segments, the public firms that composed them, and the date of these firms' IPOs are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. The "traditional" category was assumed to begin at the same time as the earliest IPO among all firms in Table A1 , December 15, 1994. 9 As Panel D shows, more than half of the contracts in our sample were signed before the first IPO in the industry segment of the partner. Contracts were signed up to 2 years before this watershed date and up to 4.5 years after the date. We interpret the difference (in days) between the contract date and the date of the first IPO in the partner category as the maturity of the industry segment at the time of contracting. In both cases, these seven exclusivity obligations were divided into two 9 We also delete these four "traditional" firms in the diagnostic regressions. The results are largely unchanged, although the coefficient of interest loses statistical significance in some cases.
10 For portals we examined whether the portal was restricted from entering into any or more than a set number of agreements with competitors; from advertising competitors anywhere on the site, in specific areas of the site, or on a continuous basis; from establishing any links to competitors' sites; and from granting the use of certain keywords or search terms to other firms. We similarly analyzed whether the partner was restricted from entering into any agreement with a competitor or agreements with competitors involving specific content; from advertising competitors anywhere on its site, in specific areas, or on a continuous basis; from promoting competitors more prominently than the portal; or from establishing any links to competitors' sites. In all cases, +1 denoted a case where this exclusivity provision was present and 0 where it was absent.
categories, those that related to establishing other alliances with competitors and those that related to restrictions on advertising competitors. Some of the restrictions clearly subsumed others. For example, restricting a party from advertising a competitor anywhere on the co-party's site clearly prohibited them from advertising a competitor on a particular section of the co-party's site. Therefore, in generating composite measures of the exclusivity of the agreements, some terms were given larger weights than others.
These weights are listed in the second column to the left. The results that follow are robust to several other weighting schemes, including the simple scheme in which each provision is given equal weight.
As Panel A shows, 40.5 percent of the alliance agreements restricted the portals from signing an alliance with any of the partner's competitors, and 8.5 percent of the agreements restricted the total number of alliances that portals could sign with partners in a given category. Roughly one-quarter of the time, portals assigned keywords uniquely to the partner firm. Overall, the portal's ability to sign agreements with the partner's competitors was at least somewhat restricted in 61.3 percent of the contracts.
Restrictions on portals' advertising behavior were present somewhat less frequently. At least some restriction on the portal's ability to advertise competitors was present in 46.2 percent of the contracts.
Panel B examines the exclusivity obligations for partners. Generally, agreements contained fewer exclusivity obligations for partners than for the portals. In 15 percent of the cases, partners were prohibited from signing (any or particular) alliances with the portal's competitors. Restriction on the partners' advertising was somewhat more frequent. In 32.1 percent of alliance contracts, there was at least one of this type of restriction.
Analysis
We examined the use of two types of contingent control rights that could be included in alliance contracts. The first set of terms related to technical performance and could be granted to the portal. These terms included the speed with which the partner's pages loaded, the percentage of time the website was available, the level of customer service, and the competitive ranking by specified third parties (e.g., a trade magazine) of the site relative to its peers. The second set of terms related to the minimum level of commercial activity that the site, content, or service covered by the agreement needed to reach and could be granted to the partner. Targets included a minimum number of user impressions that the site would garner (whether all impressions or those of some targeted subset of users), "click-throughs" into another area, revenues, or new customers. In case these levels were not reached, the agreement was typically terminated or renegotiated.
These variables were recorded as +1 if the provision was present and 0 otherwise. Table 3 summarizes the incidence of each of these performance measures in the alliance contracts. Panel A examines the use of technical contingencies in the contract, and Panel B examines the use of market-related contingencies. The median agreement contracted on no technical contingencies and one market-related contingency. In both cases, the average contract contained less than one of each type of contingency.
One potential problem with analyzing state-contingent control rights is that not all of these rights are equal. Some contingencies may cover more states of nature than others, and these provisions vary in strength. Thus, the probability-weighted likelihood that an actual transfer of control occurs will vary with the type of control right and the individual contract. While we have no empirical strategy to deal with the second of these issues, we can address with the first concern-that some control rights cover more states of nature than others-by examining the contingencies separately using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach. To complement each of the regression analyses reported below, we undertake unreported additional analyses using a non-linear (logit)
SUR to examine the allocation of individual contingencies. In all cases, the coefficients of the variables of interest estimated using the SUR procedure were of similar sign and significance level as those estimated using the composite measures.
Uncertainty and the use of contingencies
To avoid problems of interpretation, we first look only at the influence of uncertainty on the allocation of contingencies between contracting parties. Table 4 examines the correlation between the maturity of the partner's industry segment, the date of the agreement, and the nine contingencies described above. Neither the composite technical contingencies measure nor the market contingencies measure is correlated with the date of the agreement. Both measures are significantly negatively correlated, however, with the maturity of the partner's industry. This finding is consistent with the signaling models discussed in section 2. Table 4 also shows a high level of correlation among the incidence of individual technical performance measures. This suggests that technological considerations may be responsible for some of the observed patterns in the use of these performance measurements. To account for this possibility, we examine the impact of industry maturity on the sum of the contingencies using an ordered logit regression in Table 5 , controlling for a number of structural features of the relationship. The impact of industry maturity on the incidence of technical contingencies is negative and significant at the p <
.01 level when dummy variables for deal type are included.
11
Adding other characteristics of the contracting parties and the agreements to the regression reduces the magnitude of the industry maturity coefficient, but it remains significant at the p < .05
level. Finally, adding dummy variables for the portals in the agreements changes the sign of the coefficient from negative to positive and wipes out its significance. A possible reason for this result is that, for several portals, the contracts in our sample are clustered around a specific point in time (generally prior to the firm's IPO); for these observations, little identification is generated by the maturity variable once portal dummies are included.
Regressions of the incidence of market contingencies display a similar, if not quite identical, pattern. In these regressions, industry maturity is also negatively and 11 The influence of industry maturity on the use of technical contingencies is economically meaningful as well. At the median maturity and the mean of the remaining independent variables, decreasing the industry maturity by one standard deviation increases the number of technical contingencies from 0 to 1.
-25 -significantly correlated with the use of the performance measures. Including more control variables also reduces the significance of industry maturity.
The results of both the correlation and regression analyses of technical contingencies are consistent with model proposed by Dessein [2004] . When uncertainty is greater, portals are granted significantly more contingent control rights. Market-related contingent control rights granted to partners display a similar empirical pattern: the greater the uncertainty in the environment, the more likely the contract is to grant market contingencies to the partner. The latter result, however, cannot be construed as a direct test of Dessein's [2004] model and may reflect the presence of bilateral information asymmetries about the structure of parties' preferences for private benefits.
Incentive conflict and the use of contingencies
Finally, we look at how the use of contingencies reflects potential differences in the degree of incentive conflict between the contracting parties. In Table 6 , we investigate the relationship between the presence of exclusivity provisions in the alliance contracts and the use of contingencies. In Table 7 Tables 6 and 7 , as the coefficients are of the same sign and magnitude as OLS analogs to the reported regressions. In most cases, these coefficients are significant as well.
Two empirical findings emerge from this analysis:
First, there is a positive link between exclusivity restrictions on the partner and the use of technical contingencies.
• • Second, there is an even more robust statistical link between exclusivity restrictions on the portal and the use of market contingencies.
The results are strongly consistent with the view that exclusivity provisions are imperfect responses to unobserved incentive conflicts. Exclusivity provisions are more frequently included when incentive conflict is presumed to be higher, coinciding with the use of contingencies in the contracts. These results are not consistent with the alternative hypothesis that exclusivity restrictions succeed in reducing incentive conflicts between the firms and thus reduce the need for contractual contingencies. However, because the same process generates both contingent control rights and exclusivity provisions, it is not possible using the present analysis to distinguish between the incentive conflict hypothesis described above and an alternative hypothesis suggesting that another unobserved feature of the contract or the relationship between the contracting parties is driving the observed correlation.
Conclusions
A detailed examination of the structure of portal alliance contracts has allowed us to test a rich set of theories about the design of two-party agreements. In this paper, we have sought to understand the use contingent control rights in an environment in which the ex ante value of performance measures and the degree of likely incentive conflict between the contracting parties were highly uncertain. This question has recently received theoretically scrutinized but have attracted little empirical attention.
Parties include more performance measures in contracts when environmental uncertainty is greater; as industries mature, these provisions tend to be dropped. Parties also include more state-contingence control rights in contracts when more exclusivity restrictions are present in the contract. We interpret these results as supporting "control theory" models such as Dessein [2004] .
We end with a firm conviction that considerable opportunities exist for further empirical research into these issues. Of particular interest is the question of understanding the extent to which the patterns seen here generalize across industries. (Anand and Khanna [2000] represent one pioneering attempt to look at strategic alliances on a cross-industry basis.) The Internet industry during this period was one of enormous uncertainty and the contracts we analyze here were in many cases signed by inexperienced participants. Understanding the extent to which similar results are seen in other industries-and attempting to understand the determinants of any differenceswould be a rewarding area for future work. The Autoweb Site shall comply with the scale, speed and performance requirements mutually agreed upon by the parties but in no event less than that provided by the Yahoo Main Site.
AOL-1800 Flowers
3. SPEED; ACCESSIBILITY. 1-800-Flowers will ensure that the performance and availability of the Affiliated 1-800-Flowers Site (a) is monitored on a continuous, 24/7 basis and (b) remains competitive in all material respects with the performance and availability of other similar sites based on similar form technology. 1-800-Flowers will use commercially reasonable to ensure that: (a) the functionality and features within the Affiliated 1-800-Flowers Site are optimized for the client software then in use by AOL Users; and (b) the Affiliated 1-800-Flowers Site is designed and populated in a manner that minimizes delays when AOL Users attempt to access such site.
5. SERVICE LEVEL RESPONSE. 1-800-Flowers agrees to use commercially reasonable efforts to provide the following service levels in response to problems with or improvements to the Affiliated 1-800-Flowers Site:
• For material functions of software that are or have become substantially inoperable, 1-800-Flowers will provide a bug fix or workaround within two (2) business days after the first report of such error.
•
For functions of the software that are impaired or otherwise fail to operate in accordance with agreed upon specifications, 1-800-Flowers will provide a bug fix or workaround within three (3) business days after the first report of such error.
For errors disabling only certain non-essential functions, 1-800-Flowers will provide a bug fix or workaround within sixty (60) days after the first report of such error. sites for the on-line provision of Greetings (as determined, to the extent practical, over a reasonable period of time, by an independent, qualified and industry-recognized third party based on the quantity and quality of customers and product offerings).
Yahoo -American Greetings
a The actual number was redacted from the contract disclosed to investors. Table 2 Summary statistics. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. Observations are summarized by the date of the agreement, the effort required of the portal and partner (cases where the portal is expected to make the greatest effort are coded as +1, those where the partner is as -1, and those where the effort is shared or not applicable are coded as 0), the traffic on the portal and the partner's Internet properties in the month before the signing of the contract, and the financial position of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (in millions of dollars). Table 5 Ordered logit regression analyses of the use of contingencies in portal alliances. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. The dependent variables are the sums of five measures of the contingencies in the contract relating to product market performance (+1 denoted a case where this contractual element was present and 0 a case where it was absent) and four relating to technical performance. Independent variables include the maturity of the partner's industry segment (measured as days since the first IPO in the segment), the commercial focus of the agreement (either content, product sales, technology / service, or some combination of these three categories), the year of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner after the alliance signing on five key dimensions (with those where the most effort is required of the portal coded as -5 and the most effort by the portal as +5), the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract (in most regressions, +1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater reach, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases), and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater sales, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases .067 a Coefficients in this row have been multiplied by 100. *** = significant at the 1% confidence level (two-sided test), ** = significant at the 5% confidence level (two-sided test), * = significant at the 10% confidence level (two-sided test) Table 6 Ordered logit regression analyses of the use of contingencies in portal alliances with exclusivity as a proxy for information asymmetry regarding incentive conflict. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. The dependent variables are the sums of five measures of the contingencies in the contract relating to product market performance (+1 denoted a case where this contractual element was present and 0 a case where it was absent) and four relating to technical performance. Independent variables include the maturity of the partner's industry segment (measured as days since the first IPO in the segment), the count of the number of exclusivity restrictions on the partner and portal, the commercial focus of the agreement (either content, product sales, technology / service, or some combination of these three categories), the year of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner after the alliance signing on five key dimensions (with those where the most effort is required of the portal coded as -5 and the most effort by the portal as +5), the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract (in most regressions, +1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater reach, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases), and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater sales, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases). Two regressions include controls for the type of the agreement and the portals entering into the agreements (not reported). Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in brackets. .173 a Coefficients in this row have been multiplied by 100. *** = significant at the 1% confidence level (two-sided test), ** = significant at the 5% confidence level (two-sided test), * = significant at the 10% confidence level (two-sided test) Table 7 Ordered logit regression analyses of the use of contingencies in portal alliances with exclusivity residual as a proxy for information asymmetry regarding incentive conflict. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. The dependent variables are the sums of five measures of the contingencies in the contract relating to product market performance (+1 denoted a case where this contractual element was present and 0 a case where it was absent) and four relating to technical performance. Independent variables include the maturity of the partner's industry segment (measured as days since the first IPO in the segment), the count of the number of exclusivity restrictions on the partner and portal, the commercial focus of the agreement (either content, product sales, technology / service, or some combination of these three categories), the year of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner after the alliance signing on five key dimensions (with those where the most effort is required of the portal coded as -5 and the most effort by the portal as +5), the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract (in most regressions, +1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater reach, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases), and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater sales, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases). Two regressions include controls for the type of the agreement and the portals entering into the agreements (not reported). Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in brackets. .179 a Coefficients in this row have been multiplied by 100. *** = significant at the 1% confidence level (two-sided test), ** = significant at the 5% confidence level (two-sided test), * = significant at the 10% confidence level (two-sided test) Table A1 Constructing Industry Segment Maturity. IPO data were provided by Rob Cash of JP Morgan. SIC Code derived from SEC filings collected from the SEC's Edgar Online service. Category determined by examining company description in earliest SEC filing.
Category
Company Name IPO Date SIC Code Access / ISP Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.
Table A2
The payment structure and exclusivity of portal alliances. Normalized by the maximum in each category. The maximum possible value of this measure is 2. n.m. = Not meaningful.
